

JULIA NETTER

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AOS: Political philosophy. — **AOC:** History of political thought, PPE, ethics of technology.

EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS

- Doctor of Philosophy in Politics** 2013–2018
DPhil thesis title: “*Why Be Reasonable? Political Liberalism, Moral Pluralism, and Deep Disagreement*”.
Advised by Dr Gideon Elford; examined by Prof. Cécile Laborde and Dr Jeremy Williams.
Department of Politics and International Relations & Christ Church, University of Oxford, UK
- Master of Philosophy in Politics (Political Theory)** 2011–2013
MPhil thesis (distinction): “*Reasonably coercing the unreasonable? Investigating the challenge of unreasonable views to liberal political theory*”, supervised by Dr Rebecca Reilly-Cooper.
Department of Politics and International Relations & New College, University of Oxford, UK
- Bachelor of Arts in Political Science** 2008–2011
Final grade: 1.2 (distinction)
Bachelor dissertation: “*The Sovereign State in Demise? The Evolution of Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*”.
Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, Germany

WORK EXPERIENCE

- Postdoctoral Associate**, *Political Theory Project, Brown University* September 2019–
Providence, RI, USA
- Library Clerk**, *Christ Church College Library* February 2016–June 2017
Oxford, UK
- Legislative Intern with MEP Albert Deß**, *European Parliament* April–July 2011
Brussels, Belgium
- Student Research Assistant**, *Political Theory Group at the Otto-Friedrich-Universität* 2009–2011
Bamberg, Germany

MANUSCRIPTS IN PROGRESS OR UNDER REVIEW

- “Political liberalism, deep moral disagreement, and higher-order commitments to cooperation”
“What’s wrong with nonpublic reasons? The private lives of foundational beliefs”
“Don’t buckle up your data: consent, autonomy, and paternalism in data protection”

CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP PAPERS

- Constructing public reason: travels in the background culture**
Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory, Manchester, UK, September 2018.
- What’s wrong with nonpublic reasons?**
Nuffield Political Theory Workshop, Oxford, UK, October 2016.
- What’s wrong with advocacy from nonpublic reasons under circumstances of incompleteness?**
Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory, Manchester, UK, September 2016.
- Incompleteness and fundamental moral disagreement – justifying strategies to counter indeterminacy in public justification.**
Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory, Manchester, UK, September 2015.
- Investigating the challenge of unreasonable dissent to liberal political theory.**
Warwick Graduate Conference in Political and Legal Theory, Warwick, UK, February 2013.

TEACHING

POLS 920E: Moral Pluralism , Brown University Instructor	<i>Spring 2021</i>
CSCI 2390: Privacy Conscious Computer Systems , Brown University Guest lecturer	<i>Fall 2020</i>
POLS 1150 Prosperity: The Ethics and Economics of Wealth Creation , Brown University Teaching Assistant	<i>Fall 2019</i>
Tutor for Theory of Politics course , New College, Oxford Instructor for small-group teaching of undergraduate students.	<i>2015–2017</i>
Revision tutor for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) students, New College, Oxford	<i>2017</i>

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

Invited participant at the weekly Nuffield Political Theory Workshop <i>Nuffield College, University of Oxford</i>	<i>2015–2017</i>
Completed Undergraduate Teaching Training for Graduate Students <i>University of Oxford</i>	<i>October 2013</i>

ACADEMIC SERVICE

Organized the Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory	<i>September 2018</i>
Co-organized the Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory (<i>with Areti Theofilopoulou</i>)	<i>September 2017</i>

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Department of Politics and International Relations–Christ Church Studentship , fully funding DPhil research at the University of Oxford.	<i>2013–2015</i>
Scholarship by the German National Academic Foundation for pursuing a degree abroad ("Auslandsförderung"), part-funding MPhil degree at the University of Oxford.	<i>2011–2013</i>
Awarded the departmental prize for academic distinction in Political Science at Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg.	<i>September 2011</i>
Admitted to membership of the German National Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes).	<i>late 2008</i>
Awarded the prize for the highest final grade of the county in the Abitur degree, as well as prizes for highest grades in Abitur examinations in History and French.	<i>June 2008</i>

LANGUAGES

English: fluent — **German:** native speaker — **French:** advanced — **Latin:** rudimentary

REFERENCES

References are available upon request.

Political liberalism contains a commitment to public justification. The exercise of coercion on the basis of political principles is only thought to be proper if these principles are acceptable to each and every reasonable person. The fact that political liberalism restricts the constituency of public justification, *i.e.*, the constituency of those who are owed justifications, to reasonable people is significant. I argue that, as it stands, this restriction is problematic.

Specifically, political liberalism's core commitment to respect for persons as ends in themselves is in conflict with its refusal to justify their exclusion to some individuals who will be coerced. Furthermore, attempts to dispense with the need to provide justifications to the unreasonable seem to resolve that tension, but only at the cost of introducing a second defect: an impoverished and ultimately illiberal conception of the person which refuses to regard individual persons as morally autonomous.

I conclude that political liberalism must justify the very criterion of individuals' exclusion from the constituency of public justification – reasonableness – to those who fail to live up to that standard. The justifications it offers must not lose sight of the liberal commitment to respecting individuals' moral autonomy. To that end, I argue, such justifications must be rooted in the set of reasons and beliefs which individuals can be said to be committed to.

Two different kinds of unreasonableness warrant different kinds of justifications: there are those who are fundamentally unreasonable because they reject the core liberal commitment to persons as free and equal, while others merely fail to be fully reasonable when encountering deep moral disagreement in political debates, falling short of the requirement to engage with others in public reason on the basis of shared values. With respect to the former, it can be argued that a commitment to regarding their fellow citizens as free and equal is implicit in their attitude and conduct towards them. The latter individuals can be offered justifications for restraint which are rooted in the character of the very moral convictions they are tempted to draw on in public reason.

Full dissertation available at <http://www.julianetter.de/pub/dphil-final.pdf>.